During this time he married Phyllis Simms, an airline stewardess. His second in command was a young South African paratrooper Capt. GD Snygans. The unit's mission was to fight a breakaway rebel group called Simbas. From self-taught immigrant kid to newshound to art-world darling to latter-day caricature—moving from the dangerous streets of New York City to the celebrity culture of Los Angeles and then to Europe for a quixotic late phase of experimental photography and filmmaking—Weegee lived a life just as worthy of documentation as the scenes he captured.
With Flash, we have an unprecedented and ultimately moving view of the man now regarded as an innovator and a pioneer, an artist as well as a newsman, whose photographs are among most powerful images of urban existence ever made. Investigating the way Hollywood scoops up notorious criminals and turns them into legends, this entertaining who's-who guide provides thumbnail sketches of such killers as Ma Barker, Black Beard, Al Capone, John Wesley Hardin, and Charles Starkweather.
Noting that some figures are glamorized in popular culture Jesse James , while others are demonized Charles Manson , this encyclopedic collection explores the legends' emotional truths as depicted in movies, stories, and songs. Facts of the real cases behind these notorious criminals are also presented, including the landmark rulings that pioneered new approaches to criminal justice. The 4th volume of this comprehensive work features hundreds of serial killers from Sacramento to Soviet Russia—plus numerous unsolved cases.
The World Encyclopedia of Serial Killers is the most complete reference guide on the subject, featuring more than 1, entries about the lives and crimes of serial killers from around the world. Defined by the FBI as a person who murders three or more people with a hiatus of weeks or months between murders, the serial killer has presented unique and terrifying challenges to have walked among us since the dawn of time—a fact this extensive record makes chillingly clear.
The series concludes with Volume Four, T-Z. Life During Wartime, As Seen Through the Eyes of Two Congolese Teenagers Set amid the chaos of West Africa's civil wars, Emmanuel Dongala's striking novel tells the story of two teenagers growing up while rival ethnic groups fight for control of their country. At age sixteen, Johnny is a member of the Death Dealers, a rebel faction bent on seizing power.
Even as he is drawn into the rebels' program of terror, Johnny Mad Dog, as he calls himself, retains his youthful exuberance--searching for girls, good times, and adventure.
Acclaimed in France, Johnny Mad Dog is a coming-of-age story like no other; Dongala's masterful use of dual narrators makes the novel an unusually vivid and affecting tale of the struggle to survive--and to retain one's humanity--in terrifying times. The s was a tough decade, one made even tougher by Prohibition. During this lawless time in American history, a group of criminals called the Tri-State Gang emerged from Philadelphia and spread their operations south, through Baltimore to Richmond, wreaking bloody havoc and brutally eliminating those who knew too much about their heists.
Once termed the "Dillingers of the East," Robert Mais and Walter Legenza led their men and molls on a violent journey of robberies, murders, and escapes up and down the East Coast.
Join historian Selden Richardson as he recounts the story of this whirlwind of crime and how it finally reached its climax in Richmond. With the recent explosion of activity and discussion surrounding comics, it seems timely to examine how we might think about the multiple ways in which comics are read and consumed. Graphic Encounters moves beyond seeing the reading of comics as a debased or simplified word-based literacy.
Dale Jacobs argues compellingly that we should consider comics as multimodal texts in which meaning is created through linguistic, visual, audio, gestural, and spatial realms in order to achieve effects and meanings that would not be possible in either a strictly print or strictly visual text.
Jacobs advances two key ideas: one, that reading comics involves a complex, multimodal literacy and, two, that by studying how comics are used to sponsor multimodal literacy, we can engage more deeply with the ways students encounter and use these and other multimodal texts. Looking at the history of how comics have been used by churches, schools, and libraries among others will help us, as literacy teachers, best use that knowledge within our curricula, even as we act as sponsors ourselves.
Senate Hearings Author : United States. Problematically, the only local organizations in conflict-affected states capable of providing private security are warlords, militias, and insurgents who swell the ranks of the marketplace. Bagram Air Base, a strategic U. The Afghanistan company Navin also supplied a guard force of men and armed convoy escorts to the air base and is owned by former mujahideen commander Lutfullah. A now-defunct American company called U. Protection and Investigations partnered with Northern Alliance military commanders like General Din Mohammad Jurat to provide protection to former militia members.
This model of force provision did not exist before the United States arrived. In some cases, these native mercenary groups have restored order yet undermined the very institutions the Americans sought to build—a public police force, a national army, provincial administrations—elements of a Westphalian state.
For example, Commando Security is a company that escorts convoys between Kandahar and Helmand Province to the west. But if the presence of Taliban is too big to crush, then make a deal. Supply can generate its own demand in a free market for force. Like medieval mercenaries , this new breed of mercenary can prove overly brutal when executing contracts, with little or no concern for human rights.
Ruhullah deals ruthlessly with those who impede the flow of his trucks regardless of whether they are Taliban or civilian. All this has led to major investment in private warfare, making war even bigger business. The total amount the United States paid for private security is unknown, and even Congress does not know despite the fact that it writes the checks.
Contracting is now part of the American way of war. It is one of the few issues in Washington that enjoys true bipartisan support, as Republican and Democratic White Houses rely on military contractors more and more, perhaps for the wrong reasons. The implications are significant, especially for civil-military relations and democratic control of the armed forces, since using contractors may allow the executive branch to circumnavigate congressional oversight.
Additionally, the United States has grown strategically dependent on the private sector to sustain wars, creating vulnerabilities that a clever adversary could exploit. Heavy U. On the supply side, the United States has marshaled a global labor pool of mercenaries. Thousands of mercenaries got their start in Iraq or Afghanistan, and when those wars shrank, they set out looking for new conflict markets that is, war zones around the world, enlarging the wars there.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan allowed the private military industry to mature, with networks of mercenaries established and some modicum of best practices. Others are imitating the American model, and every day new private military groups emerge from countries like Russia, Uganda, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Colombia.
Their services are more robust than Blackwater, offering greater combat power and the willingness to work for the highest bidder with scant regard for human rights. They are mercenary in every sense of the word. On the demand side, the United States has de facto legitimized mercenaries by using them so heavily.
Can the United States really tell Russia not to use private military troops in Syria? No, it cannot. New consumers are appearing everywhere, seeking security in an insecure world: oil and mining companies guarding their drill sites against militias, shipping lines defending their vessels against pirates, humanitarian organizations protecting their workers in dangerous locations, oligarchs who need professional muscle, countries that want to wage proxy wars, regimes fighting civil wars, guerrillas fighting back, and the super rich for any reason you can think of, no matter how petty.
The mercenary trade is growing because mercenaries offer what clients want. It is simple supply and demand. When you want to keep a secret, sometimes the private sector is murkier than government agencies. In the United States, for example, researchers possess tools to investigate public sector actors, such as the military and CIA, using the Freedom of Information Act or public hearings on Capitol Hill.
Leakers are ubiquitous in Washington and rarely held accountable. Not so in the private sector. These firms fire employees who talk to the press, and sometimes large firms threaten media outlets with multimillion-dollar lawsuits to chill free press.
Government agencies do not do this, as evidenced by the landslide of military memoirs of secret operations during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
DOD did nothing. At least, not immediately. Government, but Owen was not tried as a felon for releasing classified information. If you want to keep a government secret, sometimes the private sector is better than the Pentagon or CIA.
This is attractive to some officials and a way of circumventing democratic accountability of the Armed Forces. For example, take the problem of mission creep. By , that number creeped to 9, troops, supported by more than 26, contractors—nearly a 3 to 1 ratio. Plausible deniability is another reason why the industry is flourishing. When a job is too politically risky, contractors are sometimes used because they can be disavowed if the mission fails.
Not so with the CIA or military. Special operations forces and CIA operatives do not get left behind, and this can be embarrassing for a nation caught running covert operations. Contractors can be abandoned with minimal political fallout. Americans do not fuss over contractor casualties, unlike dead Marines. Tellingly, Senator Obama sponsored a bill in to make armed contractors more accountable, a bill that President Obama later ignored.
Nigeria initially repudiated media reports of them employing mercenaries against Boko Haram, until it became too difficult to deny. Contractors are invisible people, making them a stealth weapon in more ways than one.
Contractors are also cheaper, just as they have been for thousands of years. The cost of these savings may come at a high price. Mercenaries are not like army reservists, to be used only when you need them.
Military contractors do not reintegrate into the civilian workforce after a war but instead look for new employers because they are profit-maximizing entities.
Worse, linking profit motive with killing encourages more war and suffering, making another Nisour Square incident inevitable. There are many reasons why private military contractors are a growth industry, but most of them are dubious. Forty years ago, the idea of using armed contractors was anathema to policymakers.
Now it is routine. This is not a Democratic versus Republican issue, but an American one. Since the s, Presidents of both parties have used military contractors. More disturbing, others around the world are imitating this model, and it is evolving into a global free market for force. Little is publicly known about the cagey world of mercenaries. Government intelligence agencies ignore them.
Reporters are rarely able to interview mercenaries and can only record events surrounding the industry. Academics depend almost entirely on the work of journalists for their analyses and too often contort their findings with inappropriate theory. What follows is an optic into the mercenary world.
It is not comprehensive, but such a study is not feasible. Mercenaries are an illicit economy, like drug-traffickers and terrorist networks, and they resist investigation. Mercenaries are not the caricatures depicted in movies. They are complex people, like all people.
It is true that some seek the lifestyle because they want to go rogue, but most do not. When I was in the field, I met guns for hire with all sorts of stories: some wanted adventure, others needed a paycheck, a lot were more comfortable with war than peace, a few wished to help others amazing but true , and many just did not have a life plan.
Being a military contractor has its practical appeals, too. A lot of American troops were deployed multiple times to Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, their home life was imploding: wife living with another man and filing for divorce, kids not recognizing their dad, personal bankruptcy, and post-traumatic stress disorder.
Rates of suicide, divorce, and domestic violence spiked among Servicemembers during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. A lot of American contractors I met signed up because they wanted their life back. Almost all mercenaries have military or national police backgrounds. There are no mercenary basic training camps, so everyone starts somewhere else, usually in a national army. Some of the larger military companies are associated with particular military units. In the U. A lot of military firms embed dog whistles to signal their credentials to attract high-end troops.
Modern soldiers of fortune have a choice between overt or covert mercenary groups, and it is uncertain which one will dominate. This is important because it may influence future war, specifically who, how, and why people fight. Overt private warriors seek legitimacy and wish to work in the open.
They rebuff the mercenary label and call themselves private security companies, advocating full transparency and accountability according to the International Organization for Standardization ISO and ISO 39 business standards. Another facilitating organization is the International Code of Conduct Association ICOCA , a Swiss initiative that establishes industry standards that comply with human rights and international law.
Government and big oil companies are more likely to hire you. However, overt actors may disappear. Or, put another way, it is busywork good for public relations and little else. A few CEOs confided in me their frustration with the certification process as too much burden for too little reward.
Like corporate social responsibility, companies will abandon these efforts if the cost-benefit ratio turns negative. The overt business model is struggling, as marquee clients do not seem more likely to hire certified security providers.
This is driving the entire industry underground, as it seeks new opportunities from clients not interested in transparency. War could get medieval. The only way to prevent this future is counterintuitive. Governments, international organizations, NGOs, and other clients who claim they want a responsible private security sector should consider employing overt actors, rather than let them literally slip to the dark side.
Customers can pool their market power, like a cartel, to enforce their best practices. This would shape the industry in fundamental ways, but this opportunity is fading. The covert side of the market for force is far more dangerous. Mercenaries are hired for plausible deniability and therefore operate in the shadows.
Few know the identity of the mercenaries operating in Syria, Ukraine, Nigeria, Yemen, and elsewhere. Fewer still know who exactly retained them and what they paid. Underground soldiers of fortune are employed for many reasons. Some consumers, like oil companies, want mercenaries because they have no security forces of their own and renting them may be preferable to relying on corrupt and incompetent host nation forces.
Others, like Nigeria, have security forces but need a niche capability, such as Mil Mi Hind attack helicopters or special operations forces teams. Still, others hire mercenaries to do things they do not want their own people doing, like human rights abuse. Historically, plausible deniability has always been a strong selling point of soldiers for hire.
How do you hire mercenaries? Overt actors seek public channels, such as their Web site and Internet job sites. Covert operations are a word-of-mouth business. Mercenaries form informal networks of shared military background, contacts, cultural identity, language, and so forth. When you make a deal with a client and initiate an operation, you recruit by tapping your network.
Trusted colleagues also recruit and vouch for their hires. Contrary to Hollywood depictions, reputation is the primary currency in the mercenary world, with money second. Those who forget this get burned.
In , mercenaries attempted a takeover of oil-rich Equatorial Guinea. Known as the Wonga Coup, it failed because of poor operational security. An individual recruited for the coup told South African, British, and American authorities of the plan, leading to the arrest of most of the mercenaries.
A key problem in a word-of-mouth business are charlatans, and the mercenary world has many. Good recruiters can spot them with a few qualifying questions, such as: What unit were you in? What years?
Who was your commander? What operations did you conduct? Did you know Sergeant Bill Smith? What was he like? Also, detailed questions about training works well. For example, if someone claims they graduated from the U.
You cannot fake it. However, this method does not scale well for large recruitment drives. There are two ways to find work as a covert mercenary. When you make a deal with a client and initiate an operation, you first recruit by tapping your network.
Mercenaries form informal networks based on shared military background, contacts, cultural identity, language, and so forth. China has a small market share but could dominate the industry by sheer numbers should it grow into an active network. Alternatively, a lone soldier of fortune could show up at a conflict market war zone and look for vacancies. Some hope Latin America might open up, given the drug wars, or the UN might hire peacekeepers.
Unfortunately, the UN suffers a bad reputation as a delinquent payer. However, this can be a dodgy way to find work.
It is better to be pulled into a contract by a trusted associate than submitting to happenstance. Worse, you could be mistaken for a journalist going undercover for a story. Covert mercenaries hug the darkness and may thump those who threaten to expose them. Conflict areas are not known for their rule of law, and few ask about people who disappear. Outside observers often assume mercenaries get paid huge sums of money.
This is inaccurate. Overt actors pay less than covert ones but offer steadier work. During the Iraq War, contractors typically made about twice their old military salary, which is not much if you think about the risks. For example, wounded contractors get immediate first aid but are otherwise sent home to fend for themselves.
Nor do contractors enjoy retirement or veteran benefits. The money on the covert side is bigger, but so are the risks.
An elite mercenary can earn four figures a week—usually in U. One of the oldest problems of the trade is contract enforcement. In other words, getting paid. There are no courts to sue in, and consequently mercenaries and their masters swindle each other. The Middle Ages and early Renaissance were full of such scandal, as Machiavelli attests.
Today, some mercenaries and clients overcome the problem of trust by forming joint ventures in mutual business interests. This may sound odd but it aligns their profit motives. More recently, the Syrian government offered oil and mining concessions to Russian oil companies and their mercenaries, such as Wagner Group, on the condition that they liberate them from IS.
Going into business together creates a sticky bond that helps guarantee good behavior all around. In truth, the distance between overt and covert actors is minimal: If you can do one, then you can do the other. The qualifications are similar and the core personnel swappable. The main difference between them is the nature of contract and market circumstances.
Few have heard of private intelligence companies, and that is by design. They offer investigative services for corporate due diligence or litigation support. However, a few are agents of plausible deniability, providing rare skills and acting as cut outs for clients. Because of this they shun publicity and advertise by word of mouth with a minimal Web presence.
These are not Ph. Who needs their own CIA? Anyone dealing in dangerous places where everyone lies to you—for example, oil companies operating in the Middle East or multinational corporations working in Africa. The financial services industry hires them for tough due diligence investigations in places such as Nigeria or Russia, where corruption is endemic. Insurance companies use them for political risk analysis, especially regarding foreign country stability, nationalization of client assets, and likelihood of armed conflict.
Law firms retain them for litigation support, and the super wealthy hire them for whatever they want. They are sometimes hired to spy on competitors and perform dirty tricks. Governments are the one client this industry will refuse. Don't miss an issue. Buy single digital issue for your phone or tablet. Bowhunter Subscribe. Shooting Times Subscribe. North American Whitetail Subscribe. In-Fisherman Subscribe. Get the top Firearms News stories delivered right to your inbox. Add an email address.
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